

CSCT Minutes

CSCT Minutes for June 28, 2022

Meeting Attendance		
	Attendee	Present
M	Arm, Cheryl	
M	Berg, Larry	
EM	Bowen, Doug	X
EM	Brady, Mikey	X
M	Brooks, Franklin	X
M	Bunde, Kermit	X
M	Chambers, Angela	X
M	Collens, Jake	X
M	Damba, Darwin	X
M	Dyke, Jimmy	
M	Eberle, Cris	X
EM	Erickson, David	X
M	Fischahs, Christopher	
M	Gilbertson, Sarah	
M	Hahn, Kevin	
EM	Hayes, David	X
S	Henley, Marsha	X
M	Hines, Tom	
M	Janson, Stephen	X
M	Ly, Gary	X
M	Marenchin, Thomas	X
M	Moore, Josiah	X
M	Moss, Patrick	
M	Murphy, Katie	X
M	Perry, Christopher	
M	Petraglia, Jeffrey	X
M	Russell, Paige	
M	Sandgren, Kevin	
M	Thrasher, David	X
M	Udenta, Gladys	
M	Vickers, Linda	
M	Wallace, George	X
M	Washburn, Peter	
M	Wilson, Robert	X
M	Wise, Tammy	
M	Woodworth, Marc	

M – Member

EM – Ex-Officio

S – Scribe

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Virtual Roll call – please acknowledge your presences in Teams chat.

Previous items update:

- All items current

Items for discussion:

- Visitors (not on the CSCT roster) that also attended: Ashley Raster, Daniel Ellis, Fitz Trumble (gave NCSP CSSG presentation) joined us
- Darwin Damba – Culture Share Safety Topic - Missing or outdated emergency contacts.
 - It's important to up-date them to ensure you/your family can be reached.
 - 94% of people don't answer unknown calls, so people need to be aware they are your emergency contact.
 - If an alternate is reached, then they should know who the primary contact is. All your contacts should know about each other.
 - Identify as many emergency contacts as possible. Identify their relationship to you, location, time of day the location may change, and the order they should be contacted.
- https://ncsp.llnl.gov/sites/ncsp/files/2022-06/ncsp_newsletter_summer_2022_rev1.pdf
 - Contact Marsha Henley (henleym@ornl.gov) if you would like to receive the newsletter.
- CSCT newest member Katie Murphy, EM-ID
 - Katie has a NE degree from Missouri University of Science and Technology. Working at INEL. Worked as a criticality engineer for a few years. Now doing NCS quals.
 - Ashley Rather, a PNNL fellow, also has a degree from Missouri University of Science and Technology. Worked at SNL last year.
- CSSG presentation of Tasking 2022-01, *CSSG Guidance to NNSA on Contract Transition Regarding Criticality Safety*.
 - Presented by Fitz Trumble, CSSG Lead on the task response.
 - Acknowledged CSCT help developing this tasking response, fast track tasking
 - Report is on the NCSP website with more detail:
 - [2022-01_cssg_tasking_response_final_42022.pdf \(llnl.gov\)](#)
 - DOE has multiple procurement/multiple contract transitions (SRS, Y-12, Pantex)
 - Many lessons learned from past transitions that resulted in serious interruptions, shutdown, mission impairments, loss in confidence
 - Six examples are discussed in the report with background, issues, and recommendations to minimize impacts
 - INL/ICP 2005
 - LLNL 2007
 - SRS 2008
 - Paducah 2011/2013
 - LANL 2012
 - Y-12/Pantex 2014
 - Set of recommendations across the planning, selection, transition, and operational stages
 - This briefing was provided to NA-50 a month ago
 - Multiple regulatory owners at single site need to be coordinated to assure mission can be made
 - When RFPs split NCS scope work should be performed by a single group to assure consistency

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- Short contracts less than 5 year should be avoided as there is no incentive to invest in the program
- In RFP require contractors to submit a written plan to manage the NCS program including staffing, funding model, reporting chain, etc.,
- Assure ability to attract, retain, and maintain staff, this needs to be watched carefully
- Ensure continuous improvement for NCS that cost savings may impacts
- Review Field Office NCS staffing levels during the transition or request help
- Contractor should have metrics to build/maintain/monitor program
- Ensure high level leadership involvement
- Upper management in reporting chain should have awareness of the NCS function
- Integrating or separating staffing needs should be watched to minimize impacts
- Criticality safety should be separate from health physics and safety basis and reports to top level manager
- Identify key resources with budget and staffing plan
- New contractor should submit DOE O 420.1C compliant Criticality Safety Program Description Document
- Make sure issues management systems maintained and not lost
- Retain or establish a Nuclear Criticality Safety Committee to engage with senior managers
- Ensure metric systems to oversee health of program
- Ensure loss of benefits does not impact program
- Ensure actions to maintain key personnel (process to keep retirees for knowledge retention)
- Ensure healthy NCSC actively engaged by senior management
- Make sure limits and controls remain relevant to operations being performed
- Questions?
 - Small sites are even more sensitive to some recommendations for transitions and have a smaller number of operations to watch, some recommendations don't apply
 - Bob Wilson discussed transitions he has been through and how culture of organization can impact the transition
 - What do you think about CS oversight groups? See CSSG response to task 2009-01, <https://ncsp.llnl.gov/sites/ncsp/files/2021-10/2009-01-tasking-response-final-090702.pdf>

Open discussion:

- No time for this

Topics for next meeting?

- No time for this

Notes:

- Send questions or comments about Tasking 2022-01, CSSG Guidance to NNSA on Contract Transition Regarding Criticality Safety to Cris. He'll decide if they should just be sent to the CSSG or if we should continue the topic next month.

Meeting adjourned at 12:05 PM ET



CSSG 2022-01: GUIDANCE FOR TRANSITION ACTIVITIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY

May 25, 2022



Background



- Department of Energy is about to undertake multiple procurements and contract transitions (e.g., SRS, Y-12, Pantex).
- Many members of the CSSG have experienced these procurements/transitions from either the contractor or Federal perspective.
- History tells us that these events, if not managed carefully, can cause serious disruptions to Nuclear Criticality Safety programs, resulting in facility pauses/work stoppages, loss of NCS competence, and multi-year mission impairment.
- The CSSG was directed to “fast track” documenting examples and providing DOE/NNSA guidance to prevent reoccurrence as part of the tasking.

Bottom Line



- The CSSG believes that historic examples shine light on causes and outcomes of these disruptions (we provide six(6) in the 2022-01 response)
- With the upcoming procurements and transitions the CSSG felt DOE/NNSA needed to be aware of and understand these examples to prevent reoccurrence (background, issues, and recommendations are provided for each example)
- Without careful management, these transitions will again lead to shutdowns, mission impairment and loss of NCS competence (we provide a list of recommendations and guidance for all stages of the procurement/transition effort). The CSCT plays a role in this (highlighted recommendations).

Examples



- Contract change creating INL and ICP (2005)
- Mission and contractor changes at Livermore (2007)
- Contract change at Savannah River (2008)
- Contract/mission change at Paducah (2011/2013)
- Organizational change at LANL (2012)
- Contract change combining Y-12 & Pantex (2014)

Conclusions



- Transitions of contracts, missions, regulators, and organizations can (and have) resulted in negative impacts to criticality safety with associated mission impact.
- Careful consideration throughout the entire planning, selection, transition, and operational stages is necessary to avoid or mitigate unintended negative consequences to the criticality safety program.
- The CSSG provides guidance/recommendations to assist the DOE in maintaining the health of the NCS program during all phases of contract or organizational transitions (RFP, interview/selection, contract transition, contractor operations post award).

Guidance during RFP stage



- If there are/will be multiple regulatory owners at a single site, these DOE organizations should coordinate during RFP development and evaluation to ensure that missions of all organizations can be maintained both during and after the contract transition.
- Where possible, avoid RFPs which 'split' existing NCS scope into multiple contracts/contractors: To the extent practical, the NCS function should be performed by a single group operating to a single program to ensure consistency. One exception is if the missions are so dissimilar that having different programs to tailor NCS to the operational needs makes sense. Where split contracts cannot be avoided, award those contracts simultaneously to prevent significant staffing shifts between contractors.
- Prime contract durations and their attendant impacts should be carefully considered as part of the contract planning process. Short duration (less than 5 years) contracts should be avoided as it does not incentivize a contractor to invest in the program or allow time for improved performance or staff development.

Guidance during RFP stage(cont.)



- In the RFP, require the contractor to submit a written plan on how to manage the NCS program specifying the organization, its mission and vision, its customers and scope of services, its required competencies, staffing and financial resources, reporting chain, and funding model.
- DOE, during RFP planning and evaluation, should specifically evaluate the ability of the contractors to attract, retain, and maintain adequately trained and qualified staff.
- Ensure continuous improvement in NCS is directly called out and scored as part of any new contract to ensure proper focus on existing and necessary initiatives.
- Request CSSG review of Field Office NCS staffing levels with recommendations, as needed, for augmented staff during RFP review, interviews, selection, and transition

Guidance during Interview/Selection stage



- **Ensure the bidding site contractor addresses metrics including those specified in the annual DOE report to DNFSB on contractor criticality safety programs and has identified key resources essential to address identified issues, improve processes, and maintain or build a strong CSP.**
- Ensure retention of qualified NCS staff is recognized as a high priority need and ensure that training, pay, and critical skills retention programs are appropriately set up to mitigate the effects from any attrition that does occur.
- Ensure high level company (enterprise) leadership for the NCS functions (both the day-to-day engineering function and the broader continuous improvement function.)
- Upper management in the reporting chain of the NCS group should have operational awareness of or experience with the NCS function.

Guidance during Transition stage



- **Integration or separation of criticality safety staff by contract and the attendant impacts on staffing, process knowledge, procedures, programs and records should be evaluated to determine ways to minimize mission impacts.**
- **Impacts on the NCS organization, its infrastructure, access to information, staffing, and programs should all be evaluated as part of the contract transition.**
- Ensure criticality safety is a safety discipline and organization separate from health physics and safety basis and reports to a top-level site contractor manager.
- Identify key resources including a budget and staffing plan including hiring, retention, and succession planning.

Guidance during Transition stage(cont.)



- Ensure the contractor submits a revised Criticality Safety Program Description Document as required by DOE O 420.1C.
- **Ensure that during transition, issues management systems are not purged or replaced without a full understanding and documentation of the issues and their current status. Open issues should be identified by the new contractor along with commitments to continue resolution of current issues.**
- Ensure the contractor retains or establishes a Nuclear Criticality Safety Committee (NCSC) as another means of ensuring engagement with senior managers. Note CSSG Response to Tasking 2009 1 provides guidance on the purpose, structure, and operations of criticality safety committees.

Guidance during Operations (post award)



- **Ensure criticality safety is formally identified as a functional area with its own performance metrics so that the contractor and field office can effectively assess the integrated health of the criticality safety program.**
- **Ensure that the impacts of staff loss due to change of benefits and reorganization do not adversely impact the criticality safety organization.**
- Consider specific actions to retain key personnel (e.g., who retire due to change of benefits) as contractors to ensure a smooth transition.
- Ensure a healthy NCSC that is actively engaged by senior management.

Guidance during Operations (post award) stage(cont.)



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- **Ensure that contractors are not driven to a “mission safe essential” program mentality where continuous improvement is sacrificed for cost savings.**
- **If split contracts are put in place, ensure contractors are incentivized to also promote overall site mission accomplishment (e.g., planning for and availability of service level agreements between contractors should be evaluated if multiple contractors are on the site.)**
- **Ensure that mission changes to be implemented in the future are not allowed to degrade the expectation for “excellent operation” at the current time.**
- **Ensure new contractors with new missions understand which limits and controls remain relevant to the operations being performed.**

Questions



- Discussions & Questions